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  1Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be divided into two types, based on the amount of 
control over the firm: wholly owned affiliates, which give a multinational firm (MNE) 100% 
control over the firm and joint ventures (JVs), which give only partial control
1. In recent decades, 
JVs seem to continue to have been a reliable channel for MNEs to transfer their production and 
technology to other countries. BEA statistics show that U.S. JV sales increased about 58% over 
the period 1989-2001, while wholly owned affiliate sales increased by about 136% over the same 
period, as shown in Figure 1. The reason that JV activities do not show such significant increase 
as it once was in the past
2 might be the Tax Reform Act of 1986
3 and the fact that, from the 
1980s to the present, restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic firms were significantly 
reduced. This allowed the formation of wholly owned and/or majority-owned affiliates in some 
developing countries, such as China and India, where they were not allowed before
4. 
Nonetheless, international joint ventures and wholly owned affiliates are important means by 
which MNEs transfer their production and technology to other countries
5. 
                                                
One of the most important reasons for the formation of a JV is a sharing incentive. 
Forming JVs with local partners can bring great benefits such as sharing of risks, skills, 
technology, production inputs, experience in local markets, and MNE familiarity with local 
political issues. Asieudu and Esfahani (2001) show that MNEs prefer JVs as a technology transfer 
 
1 Control of the firm refers to the right to make important decisions on issues such as management, production process, 
pricing, product standards, hiring and training of workers, sources of inputs, sales, and use of intangible assets. 
2 Franko (1989) finds evidence of a move toward minority owned affiliates of U.S. MNEs in the manufacturing sector 
in developing countries during the 1970s. 
3 Desai and Hines, Jr. (1999) use aggreagate sales data from U.S. minority owned affiliates in 1982 and 1989 and find 
that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the attractiveness of JVs to U.S. MNEs, particularly in low-tax host countries. 
4 Contractor (1990) finds that global liberalization in government restriction of foreign equity in the 1980s reduced the 
share of U.S. 50-50 and majority owned affiliates. 
5 According to Maskus (2000), there are three important means of production and technology transfer: FDI, licensing, 
and joint ventures. 
  2medium when the partners' assets such as technologies complementary to those of the MNE are 
of high productivity, or when a host country has weak physical infrastructure, or negative 
institutional settings such as black markets, weak rule of law
6, and high risk of expropriation. In 
addition, if the host countries have less educated workers, an MNE is likely to find investment 
costly and is therefore more likely to form JVs. However, sharing information with partners could 
create problems such as a non-proprietary use of intangible assets and various other conflicts
7. 
Therefore, the protection of IPRs is crucial to the formation of JVs. In contrast, establishing a 
wholly owned affiliate, even though it does not provide the sharing benefits, gives the MNE the 
benefits of internalization, which allow the MNE to have more control over the firm compared to 
JVs. The MNE may protect itself against possible opportunistic behavior by keeping assets or 
knowledge within the source firm where the protection of IPRs is not as crucial as it is for JVs
8. 
Desai, Foley, and Hines, Jr. (2004), show that apart from factors such as host country ownership 
restriction, tax incentives and trade with parent companies or related affiliates, MNEs are less 
likely to form JVs in situations where their intangible assets could be exploited. Moreover, 
                                                 
6 The rule of law index is obtained from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data set. It is an indicator of the 
degree to which citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions that make and implement laws 
and adjudicate disputes. Higher scores indicate sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an 
orderly succession of power. Lower scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle 
claims. The index ranges from 0 to 6. 
7 Other conflicts include problems over integration process and delegation of decision making, and disagreement 
between partners over policies, strategies, and tactics. 
8 The literature does not show whether the imitation risk is greater or lesser when knowledge or assets are outside the 
source firm. In other words, it is not established that wholly owned affiliates are less exposed to imitation compared to 
JVs. 
  3Henisz (2000) shows that majority-owned affiliates become more favored when high political 
hazard is accompanied by high contractual hazard
9. 
Therefore, based on the above reasoning and the evidence from existing studies, IPRs 
should have an effect on the ownership structure of FDI. Moreover, different ownership structure 
(JVs or wholly owned affiliates) should react to the change in IPRs differently. Hence, the 
analyses of the effect of IPRs on JVs and wholly owned affiliates should be done separately. 
Ignoring differences in the nature of JVs and wholly owned affiliates could mask the true effect 
of IPRs on FDI. 
Therefore, this paper studies the effect of IPRs on JVs and wholly owned affiliates 
separately, using empirical data on U.S. MNE. Our empirical analysis departs from the literature 
in several respects. First, unlike existing papers on ownership structure such as Beamish and 
Bank (1987), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Contractor and Lorange (1998), Gomes-Casseres 
(1989), Franko (1989), and Gomes-Casseres (1990), we will focus on the effect of IPRs on 
ownership structure. Second, this paper applies a widely used IPRs index developed by Ginarte 
and Park (1997) to capture directly the level of IPRs in the host countries, which differs from the 
approach of authors such as Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Henisz (2000), and Desai, Foley and 
Hines, Jr. (2004) that consider the IPRs in the context of the overall institutional reliability of a 
country. Third, differing from papers that study the effect of IPRs on aggregate FDI such as 
Ferrantino (1993), Maskus and Konan (1994)
10, Lee and Mansfield (1996), Smith (2001), 
                                                 
9 Henisz (2000) defines political hazard as the likelihood of political changes in the host country's government which 
either directly or indirectly affect MNEs' expected return on assets. Contractual hazard is defined as expropriation 
hazard from potential JV partners. 
10 Ferrantino (1993) and Maskus and Konan (1994) find no significant relationship between FDI and IPRs. Ferrantino 
(1993) uses international patent and copyrights convention membership as a measure of IPRs, while Rapp and Rozek's 
(1990) IPRs indices are used in Maskus and Konan (1994). 
  4Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004)
11, this paper distinguishes two types 
of FDI, JVs and wholly owned affiliates. In addition, we examine the effect of IPRs on two 
aspects of JVs and wholly owned affiliate activities: sales and the number of firms. 
The paper consists of two analyses. The first analysis is of the effect of IPRs on the sales 
of JVs and wholly owned affiliates. We find evidence supporting the internalization incentive. 
The effect of IPRs on JVs is generally larger than that on wholly owned affiliates and is 
dependent on the education level. The second analysis of the paper is of the effect of IPRs on the 
count of JVs and wholly owned affiliates. Specifically, we find a threshold level of education that 
IPRs generate different effects on JVs and wholly owned affiliates. Above this threshold level, 
stronger IPRs increase the number of JVs but decrease the number of wholly owned affiliates and 
vice-versa below the threshold level. This finding can be explained by a trade-off between a 
sharing incentive and an internalization incentive. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 explains the theoretical background. 
Section 3 describes the data set. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the effect of IPRs on FDI sales and on 
the number of firms engaging in FDI, respectively. Discussion and concluding remarks are given 
in Section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Several theoretical papers study the effect of a host country's IPRs on FDI. These papers 
vary in their assumptions of innovation. Therefore, their results are mixed. Lai (1998) models 
                                                 
11 Lee and Mansfield (1996) used a perceived IPR survey of 100 major U.S. firms and found positive effects of IPRs on 
FDI. Smith (2001) used Rapp and Rozek (1990) index to find the same results. Smarzynska Javorcik (2004) uses GP 
index to find that weak IPRs not only deters positive FDI effects but also encourages distribution of FDI rather than 
local production. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) also used GP index to study the industry-level FDI data and found that 
IPRs is less likely to attract FDI than expected. Strengthening of the IPRs requires other ingredients such as the size of 
the host country and industry characteristics to successfully attract more FDI. 
  5innovation as an introduction of new product variety and finds that stronger IPRs encourages 
FDI
12. Glass and Saggi (2002) model innovation as quality improvement and find that stronger 
IPRs decreases the FDI flows because an increase in imitation cost crowds out FDI through 
resource scarcity. Glass and Wu (2005) show that the difference in the above results may be 
driven by how innovation is modeled. They show that when the model is kept identical to Lai 
except that the type of innovation is quality improvement, the results are similar to Glass and 
Saggi (2002). Moreover, Glass and Wu (2005) distinguish between FDI flows (sales) and the 
extent of FDI defined as a fraction of the products produced by multinational firms. They find 
that the impact of IPRs on FDI flows and extent of FDI can differ depending on the assumption of 
innovation. In their model, only Northern firms have the ability to innovate (through quality 
improvement) and innovators are separated into two groups, leaders and followers. Leaders are 
firms who developed the most recent quality and have a cost advantage in designing the next-
highest quality level; followers are all other firms. In a model where the labor requirement in 
innovation for followers is sufficiently large relative to the leaders that innovation is undertaken 
only by leaders, an increase in IPRs raises both FDI flows and the extent of FDI. However, when 
the authors allow followers to be efficient and to have the same innovation cost as leaders, an 
increase in IPRs will decrease the FDI flows
13 but will increase the extent of FDI. More details 
can be found in Glass and Wu (2005). 
However, the above models focus their attention on the wholly owned affiliates side of 
the FDI. As mentioned above, the incentives to engage in wholly owned affiliates or in JVs might 
be different. Therefore, we should also look at the model of JV. Panpiemras (2005) studies the 
                                                 
12 Similarly, Yang and Maskus (2001, 2002) study the effect of IPRs on licensing and find that stronger IPRs 
encourages licensing. 
13 Glass and Wu (2005) found that increase in IPR decreases the aggregate expenditure. If we assume that the prices of 
wholly owned affiliates' products are constant, an increase in aggregate expenditure implies an increase in wholly 
owned affiliates sales. 
  6effect of IPRs on JV and considers three types of JV contract: a preventing contract, a 
compensating contract, and a self-enforcing contract. Different types of JV contracts yield 
different results for the effect of IPRs on the aggregate expenditure
14 and the extent of joint 
ventures, which is defined as the fraction of all products produced by JVs. With an assumption 
that only Northern firms can innovate and only Southern partners of the JV can imitate the 
product, the incentive for the Northern firm to engage in JV is to exploit the cost advantage of 
producing in the South. The conclusions of the Panpiemras (2005) models are as follows: 
First, in the preventing contract, Northern profit share is a decreasing function of 
imitation. When the imitation risk is high, the Northern partner sacrifices more profit share to 
discourage the Southern partner from imitation. (However, it cannot completely prohibit 
imitation.) An increase in IPRs which reduces the risk of imitation in the South will initially 
increase the incentive to engage in JV and therefore increase the demand for labor in the South 
while decreasing the demand for labor in the North. The relative wage rate in the North decreases 
which will lower the incentive to engage in JV and therefore lower both JV flows and the extent 
of JV. Second, in the compensating contract, the Northern partner requires a higher profit share 
when imitation risk is higher; therefore, the Northern profit share is an increasing function of 
imitation. An increase in IPRs reduces the imitation risk and lowers the compensation, which, in 
turn, will initially decrease the incentive to engage in JV. The demand for labor decreases in the 
South and increases in the North. An increase in relative wage rates in the North increase the 
incentive to engage in JV. Therefore JV sales and the extent of JV increase
15. 
Last, a self-enforcing contract is a preventing contract that completely prevents imitation. 
The Northern partner is perfectly informed about the Southern partner's imitating ability and 
                                                 
14 Assuming that the price of a JV's product is constant, an increase in the aggregate expenditure implies an increase in 
JV sales. 
15 This result is based on the assumption that the elasticity of the Northern profit share of a JV with respect to imitation 
is sufficiently high. 
  7imitation cost and can therefore set the reward of imitation to be lower than the total cost of 
imitation, to prevent imitation completely. In this model, Northern followers are also assumed to 
be efficient and can undertake innovation (similiar to Glass and Wu (2005)). When IPRs 
increases, just as with the preventing contract, JV sales decrease. However, the extent of JV 
increases because of the resource crowd-out effect in the North when Northern firms are 
competing in innovating. Therefore, more products must be produced in the South via JV. We 
summarize the effect of stronger IPRs on sales and the extent of JV from Panpiemras (2005) in 
Table 1
16. 
We can see from the above summary that the effect of strengthening IPR on wholly 
owned affiliates and JVs can vary depending on the assumptions of the model. Therefore 
empirical analysis is needed. Based on the above models, we can write the reduced form of the 
extent of JVs, JV sales, the extent of wholly owned affiliates, and wholly owned affiliate sales as 
functions of the Northern labor supply, the Southern labor supply, the cost of innovation, and the 
cost of imitation. The empirical models are constructed based on the reduced forms using the 
characteristics of host countries to reflect the variables of interest in order to verify empirically 
the results of imitation on wholly owned affiliates and JVs. 
Since actual data on imitation does not exist, we use an education variable
17 (EDU) along 
with an index of the strength of IPRs in the host country (IPR) to capture imitation. The strength 
of IPRs reflects an imitation cost. A high IPRs index reflects a higher imitation cost, which 
should result in an increase in FDI (both JVs and wholly owned affiliates) activities (both sales 
and the extent of FDI). The EDU variable reflects an imitating ability in the host country. We 
believe that a country having a larger portion of population with higher education should have a 
higher imitating ability than a country with a smaller portion. However, a high-EDU country is 
                                                 
16 For thorough explanation and proofs, see Panpiemras (2005). 
17 We use the percentage of the population over 25 years old having a higher than secondary level of education as a 
measure of education level in the host country. 
  8usually capable of adopting an MNE's technology to the local environment faster and has a lower 
set-up cost for MNEs, which should result in higher FDI activities. Thus, high EDU may have an 
ambiguous effect on FDI activities. 
In addition to IPR and EDU, we add real GDP per capita (GDPC), labor force adjusted by 
country size
18 (LABOR), and the interaction term between IPR and EDU to the empirical 
specification. The GDPC can capture not only the level of development of the host country, but 
also the size of the local demand in host countries. A high-GDPC country can adopt the MNEs’ 
technology to the local environment faster and provide necessary facilities for the FDI and should 
thus attract more FDI activities. The size effect implies that a larger-demand country should 
attract more FDI. Therefore, we expect GDPC to have a positive impact on FDI activities (both 
sales and number of firms). Due to friction in the labor market, a labor force variable (LABOR) 
can be used as an instrument variable for the wage rate in the host country. A larger labor force 
per GDP (the inverse of labor productivity) implies a lower wage rate which should increase FDI 
activities. The interaction variable between IPR and EDU (IPR*EDU) captures how the 
combination of IPR and EDU affects FDI activities. Adding the interaction term helps us explore 
differences in the nature of JVs and wholly owned affiliates, as we will discuss later. 
In addition to the theoretical models mentioned above, the concepts of market expansion 
and market power effect introduced in Smith (2001) can be helpful. The market expansion 
concept predicts that strong IPRs increase sales of JVs and wholly owned affiliates by ensuring 
exclusive rights over knowledge that flows to foreign countries. This effect is strengthened when 
a host country has a high ability to imitate. Thus we expect the total effect of IPRs on sales to be 
positive when EDU is high. In contrast, the market power concept predicts that strong IPRs 
reduce sales of JVs and wholly owned affiliates since it ensures a temporary monopoly over the 
protected knowledge. This effect is strengthened when a host country has a low ability to imitate. 
Thus, we expect the total effect of IPRs on sales to be negative when EDU is low. In addition, 
                                                 
18 LABORGDP=labor force/GDP 
  9according to Panpiemras (2005) and Glass and Wu (2002), we should expect the extent of JVs 
and wholly owned affiliates to change in the opposite direction of the change in sales of joint 
ventures and wholly owned affiliates, respectively. 
 
3. Affiliate Sales 
Since our focus is on both sales and the extent of FDI, we use two data sets to perform 
our analysis. For the analysis of sales, we use data on U.S. affiliate sales in 49 countries
19 in 1989 
and in the period 1993-2001. The countries in the study include both developed and developing 
ones. The data set was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis's survey reports
20. BEA 
data differentiate sales of majority-owned U.S. affiliates from sales of affiliates for which the 
combined ownership of all U.S. parents is equal to or is greater than 10% but less than 50%. We 
will refer to the latter group as JVs. The data on U.S. majority-owned affiliates are ready to be 
used. In addition, the terms majority-owned affiliate sales and wholly owned affiliate sales can be 
used interchangeably since the BEA reports that over 90% of the majority-owned foreign 
affiliates of U.S. firms are wholly owned. Subtracting sales of majority-owned affiliates from 
sales of all affiliates, we obtain sales of minority affiliates or JV sales. 
For the analysis of the effect of IPRs on the extent of joint ventures and wholly owned affiliates, 
we use counts of U.S. firms having wholly owned affiliates and counts of U.S. firms having joint 
ownership affiliates to reflect the extent of wholly owned affiliates and the extent of joint 
ventures, respectively
21. These data comprise a BEA data set of counts of U.S. firms that have 
JVs or wholly owned affiliates in 55 industries in 43 countries
22. 
                                                 
19 A list of countries in the analysis is provided in the Appendix. 
20 Details on JVs data are available on the BEA website (www.bea.gov/bea). 
21 We thank Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr. for his help in obtaining this data set. 
22 The lists of industries classified by the BEA and the lists of countries are provided in the Appendix. 
  10To measure intellectual property rights protection (IPR), we use the GP index, a common 
measure of such protection developed by Juan C. Ginarte and Walter G. Park (1997)
23. They 
examine the patent laws of a comprehensive number of countries, considering five components of 
the laws: duration of protection, extent of coverage, membership in international patent 
agreements, provisions for loss of protection, and enforcement measures. This index ranges from 
0 to 5, with higher numbers reflecting stronger levels of protection. We chose to use the 1985 GP 
index for the year 1989, the 1990 index for 1990-94, 1995 for 1995-1999, and 2000 for 2000-
2001. 
The GDPC data in millions of dollars were drawn from the Penn World data set. Data on 
labor force in millions of people were drawn from the World Development Indicators available 
on the World Bank CD-ROM. The education variable is the percentage of population aged 25 and 
over who achieve a post-secondary level of education and were drawn from Barro and Lee data 
set. Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables in the analysis of sales are 
summarized in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. All of the variables are in log format. 
 
3.1 IPR and JV Sales 
To make our analysis more concrete, we added another dependent variable, the ratio of 
JV sales to GDP, to control for some size measures. All variables in the following equations are 
in log form. 
it it it it it it it u LEDU LIPR LEDU LLABOR LGDPC LIPR LJV + + + + + + = ) * ( 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α                   (1) 
it it it it it it it u LEDU LIPR LEDU LLABOR LGDPC LIPR GDP JV L + + + + + + = ) * ( ) / ( 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α  (2) 
 where   is the log of U.S. JV sales in country i in year t;   is the log of 
the ratio of U.S. JV sales in country i to GDP of country i in year t;   is the log of the IPRs 
it LJV it GDP JV L ) / (
it LIPR
                                                 
23Another widely used IPRs index in the literature was developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990). However, these data 
were developed in the mid-1980s and are available for only one year. 
  11index of country i in year t;   is the log of the real GDP per capita of country i in year t; 
 is the log of the labor force adjusted by GDP of country i in year t;   is the log 
of the percentage of population over 25 years old having post secondary level of education of 
country i in year t; and (  is the interaction term between IPR and the education 
variable of country i in year t. 
it LGDPC
LEDU LIPR*
it LLABOR it LEDU
it )
We first run the OLS regression on equations 1 and 2. However, due to the nature of the 
panel data of 49 countries over 10 years, we suspect that there might be a country-specific effect 
in both equations. Results from an F-test and an LM test suggest that either fixed or random 
effects should be used for this data set, as they are more appropriate than the classical OLS 
regression in both equations. 
We then use the Hausman test to see whether fixed or random effects models are more 
appropriate for each equation. For both equations, we reject the null hypothesis that estimates 
from fixed and random effects models are not systematically different at a 1% level of 
significance. Therefore, the fixed effects model will be used in both equations for consistent 
estimates even though the results from both models are quite similar. The results of both models 
are reported in Table 4
24. 
For  , results from the fixed effects model are such that  LJV LIPR,  , and   
all have positive and significant impacts on JV sales. The interaction between IPR and education 
is negative but not significant. Thus, the total effect of 
LGDPC LEDU
LIPR on   is based solely on the sign 
of the coefficient of 
LJV
LIPR. An increase in LIPR increases JV sales since it increases the level of 
protection over JV products
25. The positive effect of per capita GDP confirms the size effect. 
                                                 
24 OLS estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
25 Unfortunately, the data set does not allow us to explore directly the link between imitation and the Northern share of 
a JV. 
  12For  , results from the fixed effect model are similar to those of   except 
that   becomes significant at the 1% level. As we expected, an increase in   
lowers the wage rate in the host country, resulting in higher JV activities and sales. Moreover, we 
can conclude that for both regressions, the market power effect, where an increase in IPR reduces 
the JV activities, could only be achieved at an extremely high education level. However, it does 
not have a significant effect in the model. 
) / ( GDP JV L LJV
LLABOR LLABOR
 
3.2 IPR and Wholly Owned Affiliate Sales 
Next, we extend our analysis to another type of FDI, wholly owned affiliates. Even 
though the BEA does not provide data on sales specific to wholly owned affiliates, based on the 
1995 BEA survey, about 90% of U.S. majority-owned affiliates are wholly owned affiliates. 
Therefore, it is sensible to use the term interchangeably. Therefore, we use the data set of sales of 
U.S. majority-owned affiliates over the same period as the analysis of JVs as a proxy for sales of 
U.S. wholly owned affiliates. As in the previous section, for a robustness check, we also use sales 
of the U.S. majority-owned affiliates per host country GDP as an additional dependent variable. 
it it it it it it it u LEDU LIPR LEDU LLABOR LGDPC LIPR LMAJOR + + + + + + = ) * ( 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α      (3) 
it it it it it it it u LEDU LIPR LEDU LLABOR LGDPC LIPR GDP MAJOR L + + + + + + = ) * ( ) / ( 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α
(4) 
where   is the log of U.S. majority-owned affiliate sales in country i in year t; 
 is the log of the ratio of U.S. majority-owned affiliate sales in country i to the 
GDP of country i in year t. 
it LMAJOR
it ) GDP MAJOR L / (
In JVs, sharing information between different firms often leads to a violation of the 
protection of proprietary assets and even to imitation. Therefore, IPR is a crucial factor which 
partners should take into account before forming JVs. In wholly owned affiliates, firms 
internalize their technology in order to have more control over their proprietary assets. As a 
  13result, IPR should not be as crucial to the majority-owned affiliates as to the JVs, unless the 
imitating capacity in the recipient country is very high. Therefore, we expect IPR to affect JVs 
more than it affects the wholly owned affiliates. In other words, JV sales should be more 
responsive to a change in IPR than wholly owned affiliate sales. 
Following the same process as in the analysis of JV sales, the Hausman test confirms that 
the fixed-effect model is more appropriate for this data set, as it gives consistent estimates. The 
results of both fixed effect and random effect models for equations 3 and 4 are reported in Table 
5
26. 
As we expected, results from the fixed-effect models show that the real GDP per capita 
and labor force per GDP have significantly positive effects on both wholly owned affiliate sales 
and wholly owned affiliate sales per GDP. IPR alone negatively affects both dependent variables; 
however, the interaction term between IPR and the education variable is positive. The total effects 
of IPR on both dependent variables will be positive if the education level is sufficiently high. The 
positive total effect implies the market expansion effect. That is, when the education level is high, 
stronger IPR increases sales and sales per GDP of the wholly owned affiliates. From our 
calculation, IPR has a positive effect on sales and sales per GDP if   is higher than 0.549 
and 0.727, respectively. In our data set, around 96% of the sample has an   level higher 
than 0.727 (more than 2.1% of the population over 25 years old have more than a secondary level 
of education). Therefore, stronger IPRs increases wholly owned affiliate sales and sales per GDP 
in most of our sample. Moreover, education positively affects both sales and sales per GDP. 
Thus, the total effect of   on sales and sales per GDP is positive unless 
LEDU
LEDU
LEDU LIPR is less than 
zero. Less than 1% of our sample indicates such a low level for the IPRs index. Thus, on average, 
an increase in education increases both sales and sales per GDP of wholly owned affiliates. 
 
 
                                                 
26 OLS estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
  143.3 Comparison of the effect of IPRs on JV sales and wholly owned affiliate sales 
Regarding the concern over the heteroskedasticity problem, we apply the White test to 
equations 1-4. Based on this test, we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at a 1% level 
of significance in all equations. There exist heteroskedasticity problems in all equations. We 
correct the problems by using the robust covariance estimators. Results similar to those in the 
previous subsections are shown in Table 6. 
As shown in Table 6, the real GDP per capita and labor force per GDP have positive 
effects on all equations. LIPR
LIPR
 is positively significant at 1% for both   and   
while the interaction term   is negative but not significant. Education is positive and 
significant at a 1% level for both   and  . The results for wholly owned affiliate 
equations show that IPR has a significant negative impact on   and  . 
The total effect of 
LJV ) / ( GDP JV L
) /GDP MAJOR
LEDU *
LJV ) / ( GDP JV L
LMAJOR ( L
LIPR on   and   is positive if   is greater than 
0.549 and 0.727, respectively. Education has a positive effect on both overall sales and sales per 
GDP of wholly owned affiliates even though it is not significant in the sales per GDP equation. 
The total effect of LEDU  is positive if 
LMAJOR ) / ( GDP MAJOR L LEDU
LIPR is positive. 98.54% of our sample has an IPR index 
greater than 1. Thus, it is very likely that an increase in education level will lead to an increase in 
sales and sales per GDP of the wholly owned affiliates. 
It is surprising that the education level required to produce a positive total effect of IPR 
on wholly owned affiliate sales is very low compared to the sample mean. Despite the low level 
of the LEDU , our results support the findings on Smith (2001) that we see a market expansion 
effect when the ability to imitate is high and a market power effect when the ability to imitate is 
low. In addition, it is interesting that while LIPR only has a positive effect on sales of JVs, it 
could have either a positive or a negative effect on sales of wholly owned affiliates, depending on 
the education level of the host country. In other words, we find evidence of both a market 
expansion effect and a market power effect on wholly owned affiliate sales-but not in JV sales. 
  15To explore this result further, we use the maximum and minimum level of   to 
obtain the range of magnitude of the total effect of 
LEDU
LIPR on  , which is [-0.482,0.660], 
while the total effect on LJV is 0.443. We can see that when looking at only the positive effect of 
LMAJOR
LIPR, it has a greater effect on   than on   when   is larger than 2.16 
(representing 56% of our data set). Our inference is that IPR is more crucial to JVs compared to 
wholly owned affiliates. However, when the imitation ability is strong (a high level of  ), 
the MNE would prefer to internalize its knowledge by establishing the wholly owned affiliates. 
LJV LMAJOR LEDU
LEDU
We are aware of other variables that might be included in the regression models. 
Therefore, additional variables, including total trade as a percentage of real GDP which explains 
the openness of the host country, investment as a share of real GDP, and the growth rate of real 
GDP, are considered
27. For all equations, adding these variables does not change the signs of the 
previously included variables, but only reduces the significance level of variables such as   
and  .  Moreover, following Smith (2001), we also add other measures of imitation ability 




28 as a robustness check. In all equations, an increase in R&D expenditure attracts 
more investment to the host country in both forms while the number of researchers in the host 
country does not have a significant impact on any type of investment. Results showing robust 




                                                 
27 These data were drawm from Penn World Table 6.1. 
28 These data are drawn from the Statistical Yearbook of UNESCO. 
29 The OLS results are robust from using the Rapp and Rozek (1990) IPRs measure with the exception that this measure 
is not significant in JV equations. The reason could be that RR index data were available for only one year and 
therefore did not show enough variation to pick up the effect of IPRs on volume of JV sales. Moreover, since these are 
country-specific data that do not change over time, the RR index is dropped in the fixed and random effect models. 
  164. IPRs and Number of Affiliates 
Apart from the effect of the IPRs on the sales of JVs and wholly owned affiliates, it is 
interesting to see how IPRs affects the number of JVs and wholly owned affiliates which 
represent the extent of FDI. To analyze this issue, we use a BEA data set of counts of U.S. firms 
that had JV or wholly owned affiliate activities in 1995. These data give the numbers of U.S. 
firms that have wholly owned affiliates or the joint ownership affiliates across 55 industries in 43 
countries, both developed and developing
30. 
Beyond the country characteristic variables used in the previous sections, we also add 
industry characteristic variables. These include R&D expenditure as a fraction of total sales by 
industry of U.S. parents measured in U.S. dollars, and employees of U.S. parents by industry 
measured in thousands
31. These data are collected by the BEA. R&D expenditure as a fraction of 
sales (R&D/SALES) can be used to reflect the level of technological intensity of each industry. 
Firms with higher R&D intensity should be likely to take advantage of incentives provided by 
foreign countries in order to retrieve more profits overseas to offset the money they invest in 
R&D. The measure of employees of U.S. parents by industry (EMPLOYEE) reflects the size of an 
industry in the U.S. U.S. firms in a large industry are more likely to take advantage of 
opportunities to engage in FDI than firms in a small industry. Therefore, we expect both 
R&D/SALES and EMPLOYEE to have positive relationships with the number of U.S. affiliates, 
both JVs and wholly owned. Summary statistics and a correlation matrix of variables used in this 
section are provided in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
 
                                                 
30 This total count of U.S. firms is 9498. Of this number, 2252 firms are considered JVs (24% of the total count), which 
leaves 7242 firms to be considered as wholly owned affiliates. 
31 A U.S. parent is a person, resident in the U.S., who owns or controls 10% or more of the voting securities, or the 
equivalent, of a foreign business enterprise. 
  174.1 Model Selection 
To analyze this count data set, we chose the most appropriate model from three 
candidates: Poisson regression, negative binomial model, and zero-inflated negative binomial 
model. The Poisson regression has been widely used in analyzing count data. However, it relies 
on a strong assumption that the conditional mean of the dependent variable equals its conditional 
variance. From the goodness of fit test of our data set, we find that we can reject the hypothesis 
that the data are Poisson distributed at a 1% level of significance in both the JVs and the wholly 
owned affiliates model
32. 
An overdispersion of the data could be attributed to an unobserved heterogeneity or to 
excess zeroes in the count (the nature of the process generating zero). If the overdispersion arises 
from the unobserved heterogeneity in the data, a negative binomial model which introduces an 
individual unobserved effect into the conditional mean would be appropriate. We use the 
Likelihood Ratio test (LR test) to check whether the negative binomial regression has a 
conditional mean equal to the conditional variance, and can conclude that the negative binomial 
mode is more appropriate to our data than the Poisson in both the JV and the wholly-owned (WO) 
equations
33. 
However, our data set contains many zeroes, which could also lead to an overdispersion 
problem. To tackle these excess zeroes, we use the zero-inflated negative binomial that uses a 
logit model to account for them. This model provides a treatment of zero counts separate from 
strictly positive counts. The zero outcomes can arise in one of two regimes. In one the outcome is 
always zero, and in the other the negative binomial can produce zero counts or positive counts. 
Using the Vuong test, we find that the zero-inflated negative binomial models are more 
                                                 
32 The chi-square for the JV model is 4775.599 and 11958.75 for the wholly owned affiliates model. 
33 The chi-square values for the JV and WO models are 1169.41 and 6731.72, respectively, allowing us to reject the 
null hypotheses in both models. 
  18appropriate to both equations than are the negative binomial models
34. Nevertheless, we report 
results for all three models in Tables 9 and 10. The marginal effects of each independent variable 
are included to aid interpretation. All results are corrected for the heteroskedasticity problem 
using the robust covariance estimators. Even though we interpret the results for just the zero-
inflated negative binomial models, it should be pointed out as a robustness check that results from 
all three models are similar in terms of the signs of all coefficients. 
 
4.2 IPR and the number of JVs 
The results of the zero-inflated negative binomial regression on the JV model are shown 
in Table 9. The signs of GDPC, R&D/SALES, and EMPLOYEE are positive and significant. As 
we expected, firms in technologically intensive industries choose JV more than firms in industries 
that have lower R&D/SALES.  Firms in large industries engage in JV more than firms in small 
industries. LABOR/GDP is negatively significant. Normally, an increase in LABOR/GDP (a lower 
productivity of labor) would imply a lower wage, providing a cost-saving incentive for MNEs. 
The negative sign of LABOR/GDP could reflect the need for high-productivity labor for JVs 
rather than cheap but low-productivity labor. Moreover, our results highlight the role played by 
IPRs and education on the number of JVs. IPR has a negative and significant effect on JV. 
However, the interaction term (IPR*EDU) has a positive and significant effect on JV. The total 
effect of IPR on JV will be positive if EDU is higher than 7.5306 (more than 7.5306% of the 
population over 25 years old achieves a higher than secondary level of education)
35. Therefore, as 
IPRs gets stronger, we experience the market expansion effect in terms of the number of JV at a 
sufficiently high EDU. EDU has a significant negative impact on JV; its total effect on JV is 
                                                 
34 Voung statistics for the JV and WO models are 7.71 and 4.70, respectively. These statistics are large enough to 
confirm that the negative binomial models are not appropriate for the data sets at a 1% level of significance. 
35 Approximately 37% of our sample has a lower number. 
  19positive if the IPRs index is higher than 3.061
36. Therefore, a higher EDU fails to increase the 
number of JVs at a sufficiently weak IPRs level
37. 
 
4.3 IPR and the number of wholly owned affiliates 
The results of the zero-inflated negative binomial WO model are shown in Table 10. As 
we expected, the signs of RGDPCAP, R&D/SALES, and EMPLOYEE are significantly positive. 
IPR has a positively significant effect on WO. However, the interaction term between IPR and 
EDU has a negatively significant impact on WO. The total effect of IPR on WO is positive if 
EDU is lower than 7.367
38. EDU has a positively significant effect on WO. The total effect of 
EDU is positive if the IPRs index is lower than 3.067
39. Therefore, stronger IPRs fails to increase 
WO if EDU is sufficiently high, and higher EDU fails to increase WO if IPRs is too strong. 
 
4.4 IPR, Education and the number of affiliates: Evidence of substitution between 
JVs and Wholly owned affiliates 
The results from the previous sections show the substitution between JVs and wholly-
owned affiliates. Stronger IPRs has different effects on JVs and wholly owned affiliates 
depending on the level of EDU. The threshold level of EDU is about 7.4488 (the average of 
7.5306 and 7.367 from the last two sections). If EDU is greater than the threshold level, a 
stronger IPRs increases the number of JV and decrease the number of wholly owned affiliates. 
Thus, stronger IPRs could attract the exercise of either JVs or wholly owned affiliates depending 
on the education level of the host country. We also find the substitution between JV and wholly 
                                                 
36 Approximately 44% of our sample has a weaker IPR. 
37 The results are robust to using an alternative IPR measure (Rapp and Rozek index). 
38 Approximately, 35% of the sample has a lower EDU. 
39 Approximately 44% of our sample has a weaker IPR level. 
  20owned affiliates with an IPRs threshold level when the education level changes. The IPRs 
threshold is about 3.064; above this level, an increase in EDU increases the number of JVs and 
decreases the number of wholly owned affiliates. If the IPRs index in the host country is below 
this threshold, an increase in education level will increase the number of wholly owned affiliates 
and decrease the number of JVs. Therefore, a higher EDU could attract either JVs or wholly 
owned affiliates, depending on the strength of IPR in the host country. 
The switching between JV and WO when there is a change in either IPR or EDU is a 
result of the trade-off between two incentives, a sharing information incentive and an 
internalization incentive. JV formation brings benefits mostly from sharing information, 
knowledge, skills, and resources among partners. The sharing incentive would be most beneficial 
when both partners acquire knowledge specific to the production of JV, and IPRs protection is 
strong in order to protect partners from opportunistic behavior. When EDU is low, implying that 
a host partner could not provide an MNE with specific skills or knowledge, even stronger IPR 
could not induce more JV formation. An MNE would rather control the whole entity themselves, 
which leads to an increase in wholly owned affiliates. Moreover, if IPRs is too weak, making it 
risky to share information through a JV, an increase in EDU might suggest an increasing ability 
to imitate among the local partners. This decreases the JVs and increases the wholly owned 
affiliates instead. On the other hand, wholly owned affiliates benefit most from internalization by 
keeping knowledge, skills, and assets within the controlling firm. The internalization incentive 
would be most beneficial when weak IPRs protection prevails in the host country, the set up cost 
is low, or both. Therefore it is not surprising that our results show that stronger IPRs would 
increase the number of JVs but decrease the number of wholly owned affiliates when EDU is 
sufficiently high. The inference is as follows: As IPRs gets stronger, the sharing incentive starts 
to overshadow the internalization incentive when EDU exceeds the threshold level. Moreover, an 
increase in EDU increases the number of JVs but decreases the number of wholly owned 
  21affiliates when IPR is sufficiently strong. This is because as EDU increases, the sharing incentive 
begins to dominate the internalization incentive when the IPRs index exceeds the threshold level. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
FDI adopts two types of ownership structures: JVs and wholly owned affiliates. The 
choice is based on the juxtaposition of the sharing and the internalization incentives. 
Consequently, JVs and wholly owned affiliates would react to changes in IPR differently. Thus, 
instead of studying aggregate FDI, we should look at JVs and affiliates separately. In this paper, 
we examine empirically the effect of IPR on two aspects of FDI: sales and the number of firms. 
We find that stronger IPR increases sales of JVs and wholly owned affiliates even in a host 
country that has a modest ability to imitate. We also find evidence of a market expansion effect 
on sales of wholly owned affiliates. 
When analyzing the effect of IPRs on the number of JVs and wholly owned affiliates, 
stronger IPRs generally provides an incentive for U.S. MNEs to form either JVs and wholly 
owned affiliates, depending on the education level of the host country. We find a threshold level 
of education where IPRs has different effects on JVs and wholly owned affiliates. At a level 
above the threshold, stronger IPRs increases the number of JVs and decreases the number of 
wholly owned affiliates, and vice-versa below the threshold level. These threshold levels can be 
explained by the trade-off between the sharing information incentive and the internalization 
incentive for the MNEs. The sharing incentive works best when local partners are able to share 
information, knowledge, and assets without concern over opportunistic behaviors by partners. As 
IPRs gets stronger, the internalization incentive dominates the sharing incentive because partners 
in the host country are not able to provide adequate knowledge and technology, as reflected by a 
low level of education. However, the sharing incentive becomes dominant if partners in the host 
country are capable of providing sufficient knowledge and technology to MNEs. From a policy 
  22perspective, IPRs policy could be used effectively to target both types of FDI, depending on the 
education level of the host country. 
Combining the results in both analyses, we can outline the effect of IPR on FDI. IPRs can 
generate a complicated and profound effects on FDI. Stronger IPRs affects sales and the number 
of firms differently. 
Our results show that stronger IPRs increases JV sales, but could decrease the number of 
JVs if the education level of the host country is sufficiently low. Moreover, stronger IPRs could 
increase sales of wholly owned affiliates if the education level is sufficiently high, and could 
decrease the number of wholly owned affiliates if the education level of the host country is 
sufficiently low. As IPRs becomes stronger, we could experience a simultaneous increase in sales 
and decrease in the number of firms. Our results also show that not all firms benefit from stronger 
IPR. We conjecture that large and/or technology-intensive firms should benefit from stronger 
IPR, for several reasons. First, large MNEs usually acquire advance and specific technology that 
generates more profits. Therefore, the protection of their technology is crucial. In addition, a large 
MNE is able to take advantage of an increasing returns to scale as sales increase. As larger firms 
gain more sales, small firms shrink further and are eventually forced to leave the market. 
Moreover, an increase in sales for large MNEs uses more resources, resulting in less resources' 
being available to other firms. Consequently, some small MNEs are pushed out of the market. As 
shown in our analysis, it is possible that stronger IPRs benefits large MNEs by increasing their 
sales, but hurts small firms and drives them out of the market, which results in a reduction in the 
number of firms. 
Relating the effect of IPRs on sales to the effect IPRs on the number of firms seems 
intuitive. However, there are two important points that we must be careful with. First, the data on 
sales are not perfectly compatible with the data on the number of firms. While we use data on the 
sales of majority-owned affiliates, data on the number of firms belongs to wholly owned 
affiliates. We could assume that the sales of majority-owned affiliates are close enough to the 
  23sales of wholly-owned affiliates, since over 90% of the majority-owned are wholly owned 
affiliates according to the BEA survey. Second, while the data of sales reflect a panel of countries 
over 10 years, the data of the number of firms reflect a panel of countries and industries over just 
one year (1995). Despite these points, the results from both data sets provide us with an 
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  26Table 1: Summary of effects of stronger IPRs 
Type of Contract  Sales  Extent of JVs 
Preventing  decrease decrease 
Compensating  increase* increase* 
Self-Enforcing  decrease increase 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the sales analysis 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
LJV  473 7.45  1.88 0  11.52 
L(JV/GDP)  359 -4.52  1.12  -8.31  -0.58 
LMAJOR  475 9.41  1.54  5.55  12.94 
L(MAJOR/GDP)  463 -16.39  1.04  -21.12  -14.00 
LIPR  481 1.05  0.39  -1.11  1.55 
LGDPC  480 9.22  0.85  -6.56  10.69 
LLABOR  489  -9.69 1.33 -11.80  -6.37 
LEDU  469 1.99  0.60  -1.20  2.95 
Notes: LJV denotes log of JVs sales in millions of U.S. dollars. L(JV/GDP) denotes log of JV sales adjusted by real GDP 
in U.S. dollars. LMAJOR denotes log of  majority-owned affiliates sales in millions of U.S. dollars. L(MAJOR/GDP) is 
log of majority-owned affiliates sales adjusted by real GDP in U.S. dollars. LIPR denotes the log of IPR index developed 
by Ginarte and Park (1997). LGDPC denotes log of real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. LLABOR denotes log of labor 
force adjusted by real GDP. LEDU denotes log of the percentage of population over 25 year old having higher than 
secondary level of education. 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of the variables in the sales analysis 
 LIPR  LGDPC  LLABOR  LEDU 
LIPR  1     
LGDPC  0.703 1     
LLABOR  -0.702 -0.977  1   
LEDU  0.521 0.392 -0.426  1 
 
 
  27Table 4: JV models 
LJV L(JV/GDP)  Variable 
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
















































R2  0.257 0.285 0.044 0.199 
Observations  416 416 414 414 
F test  ***  ***  
LM test   ***  *** 
Hausman test  Fixed Fixed 
Estimated coefficients are shown together with the standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
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Table 5: Wholly owned affiliate models 
LJV L(JV/GDP)  Variable 
Fixed Random Fixed Random 
















































R2  0.460 0.465 0.062 0.069 
Observations  418 418 418 418 
F test  ***  ***  
LM test   ***  *** 
Hausman test  Fixed Fixed 
Estimated coefficients are shown together with the standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
















  29Table 6: Fixed effect models with robust covariance estimators 
Variable LJV  L(JV/GDP)  LMAJOR  L(MAJOR/GDP)
















































R2  0.916 0.778 0.982  0.961 
Observations  416 414 418  418 
Estimated coefficients are shown together with the standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 




Table 7: Summary Statistics of the variables in the count model 
Variable Observations Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
JV  2365 0.920  1.735  0  25 
WO  2365 2.825  5.972  0  84 
IPR  2365 3.177  0.860  1.08 4.24 
GDPC  2365 13794  7548 1979  25674 
EDU  2365 8.9  3.542  1.6  15.6 
LABOR/GDP  2365 0.0003  0.0016  0.00001  0.0105 
R&D/SALES  2365 0.018  0.024  0  0.084 
EMPLOYEE  2365 364.281  475.709 7.6 2667.9 
Notes: JV denotes counts of U.S. firms having joint ventures activity in 1995. WO denotes counts of U.S. firms having 
wholly owned affiliates activity in 1995. IPR denotes the IPR index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997). GDPC denotes 
real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. LABOR/GDP denotes labor force adjusted by real GDP. EDU denotes percentage of 
population over 25 year old having higher than secondary level of education. R&D/SALES denotes R&D expenditures as a 
fraction of total sales by industry of U.S. parents in U.S. dollars. EMPLOYEE denotes numbers of employees of U.S. 




  30Table 8: Correlation matrix of the variables in the count model 
  IPR GDPC  EDU  IPR*EDU  LABOR/GDP R&D/SALES EMPLOYEE 
IPR  1           
GDPC  0.745  1         
EDU  0.384  0.333  1       
IPR*EDU  0.718  0.580  0.890  1     
LABOR/GDP  -0.282 -0.275 -0.094  -0.197  1     
R&D/SALES  0 0 0  0  0  1   
EMPLOYEE  0 0 0  0  0  0.156  1 
 
 
Table 9: Counts of JV model 
Poisson Negative  Binomial  Zero-inflated 
Variable 
JV  Marginal 
effect  JV  Marginal 
effect  JV  Marginal 
effect 































































































Constant       0.340*** 
(0.107) 
 









Estimated coefficients are shown together with the standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance respectively.  
 
 
  31Table 10: Counts of WO model 
Poisson Negative  Binomial  Zero-inflated 
Variable 
WO  Marginal 
effect  WO  Marginal 
effect  WO  Marginal 
effect 



























































































Inflate WO       -20.667*** 
(-1.024) 
 
Constant       -1.024*** 
(0.134) 
 









Estimated coefficients are shown together with the standard errors in parentheses. ***,**, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance respectively.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Lists of countries in the sales analysis 
Argentina Australia  Austria  Belgium  Brazil Canada Chile  Columbia  Costa  Rica 
Denmark Ecuador  Egypt  Finland  France Germany  Greece  Guatemala  Honduras 
Hong Kong  India  Indonesia  Ireland  Israel Italy  Japan  Korea  Luxembourg 
Malaysia Mexico  Netherlands  New  Zealand  Nigeria Norway  Panama  Peru  Philippines 
Portugal   Saudi Arabia  Singapore  South Africa Spain  Sweden  Switzerland  Taiwan  Thailand 
Trinidad and Tobago  Turkey  England  United Arab Emirate  Venezuela     
Table A2: Lists of countries in the count data analysis 
Argentina Australia  Austria  Belgium  Brazil Canada Chile  Columbia  Costa  Rica 
Denmark Egypt  Finland  France  Germany Greece  Guatemala  Hong  Kong  India 
Indonesia Ireland Israel  Italy  Japan Korea  Malaysia  Mexico  Netherlands 
New Zealand  Norway  Panama  Peru  Philippines Portugal Singapore South  Africa  Spain 
Sweden Switzerland  Thailand  Trinidad  and Tobago  Turkey  England  Venezuela   
Table A3: Lists of industries in the count data analysis 
1  Agriculture, forestry, and fishing  29  Farm and garden machinery 
2 Mining  30  Construction,  mining,  and materials handling machinery 
3  Crude petroleum extraction (no refining) and gas  31  Industrial machinery and equipment 
4  Oil and gas field services  32  Computer and office equipment 
5 Construction  33 Household  appliances 
6  Food and kindred products  34  Household audio and video, and communications equipment 
7  Grain mill and bakery products  35  Electronic components and accessories 
8  Beverages  36  Electronic and other electric equipment, not elsewhere classified 
9  Other food and kindred products Mfg.  37  Motor vehicles and equipment 
10 Tobacco  products 38  Other  transportation equipment, nec 
11  Textiles products and apparel 39  Transportation  equipment 
12  Lumber, wood, furniture, and fixtures  40  Transportation 
13  Paper and allied products  41  Communication 
14  Printing and publishing  42  Electric, gas, and sanitary services 
15  Industrial chemicals and synthetics  43  Petroleum wholesale trade 
16 Drugs 44  Retail  trade 
17  Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods  45  Insurance 
18  Agricultural chemicals  46  Real estate 
19  Chemical products, not elsewhere classified  47  Hotels and other lodging places 
20 Integrated  petroleum  refining and extraction  48  Advertising 
21  Petroleum refining without extraction  49  Equipment rental (except automotive and computers) 
22  Petroleum and coal products, not elsewhere classified  50  Computer and data processing services 
23  Rubber products  51  Business services, not elsewhere classified 
24  Miscellaneous plastics products  52  Motion pictures, including television tape and film 
25  Glass products  53  Health services 
26  Stone, clay and nonmetallic mineral products  54  Engineering, architectural, and surveying services 
27 Ferrous 55  Management  and public relations services 
28 Nonferrous     
 